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ABSTRACT
Many applications on Android rely on advertisements for revenue. In the
current advertisement model, ad libraries are linked to host applications and
their permission requirements are coupled. More permissions means more
targeted ads, which brings more revenue. As a result, developers tend to
seek more permissions from the user, which is not desirable with regard to
the user’s privacy. In this thesis work we attempt to address two approaches
to solve this problem. The first separates ad library permission requirements
from the host application, and the second provides users with a four-level
privacy-concerned advertisement mechanism.
Though developing the ad module and the host app in two different ap-
plications makes sure that the permission requirements are separated, the
ad module requires interaction with the user through the host app. The
Android system does not yet support cross-application embedding and inter-
action. In this thesis work, we build our model based on an existing work
called LayerCake, which supports secure embedded user interfaces by mod-
ifying the Android system, allowing the host application to embed another
activity that runs in a separate process.
We propose to provide users with four levels of ads to choose. Highest
Privacy Level (Level 3): No Ads, which means the user makes a payment
directly to the provider to get rid of the ads; Fundamental Privacy Level
(Level 2): Plain Ads, which means the advertiser broadcasts ads without
targeting; Pragmatism Privacy Level (Level 1): Inter-app Ads, which means
we utilize installed packages information to select advertisements; Trusted
Privacy Level (Level 0): In-app Ads, which means we gather user information
in the host app to provide more targeted ads.
Our work, Four-Layer Cake, using the above two approaches, effectively
creates an architecture that Android users are aware of how their information
are collected and used, so they can select their own privacy and service level.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the prevalence of the current design of application and advertisement
model, the resulting problems are attracting more and more attention. In the
current advertisement model, ad libraries are linked to host applications, and
they may require additional permissions to gather user personal information
on the devices to provide more targeted ads. These permission requirements
are then directly presented to the users as requirements of the host appli-
cations. The current advertising business model accepted in the Android
market is the main mechanism that helps fund the exploding emerging of
mobile phone applications. Regardless of the fact that this model has been
prevalent in the Android application market, it has significant drawbacks
with regard to the protection of user privacy. As more detailed user informa-
tion tends to results in more targeted ads, more targeted ads brings about
more revenue, the developer is likely to seek more permissions from the user,
an ad library tend to abuse a host application’s permissions. Another draw-
back of this current model is for the advertiser: a malicious application could
simulate interactions between the advertisement and the user to cheat the
advertiser in order to make more revenue.
1.1 Overview
In Android on-line advertising, there are a number of models which aim at
privacy-preserving erupting in recent years. They are able to provide privacy
protection via effective ways such as delivering mock information to the ap-
plication [1, 2] or using differential privacy to avoid profiling due to details
[3]. Most of these models have been focusing on the preserving of privacy
and are successful to some extent, but have given too little attention to the
needs of a huge party in the advertising market: the advertisers. The fact
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that the implications for a market is largely driven by the accurate profiling
of users is merely considered [4]. These models are either unable to provide
accurate ad profiling or are too complicated that advertisers find it difficult
to adopt. As a result, there is hardly any practical model existing that could
properly balance between Android user privacy protection and advertisement
profiling. This project is trying to solve this problem by applying the idea of
privacy-level negotiation into current privacy-protection advertising models.
1.2 Problem Statement
The market of Android on-line advertising contains three primary parties:
advertisers, who make profit by selecting targeted advertisements using accu-
rate user profiling information; developers, who receive reward/revenue from
advertisers by providing accurate user information for profiling; and users,
who provide their private information in exchange for services offered by de-
velopers. A practical privacy-preserving advertising model should equally
consider the interest of all three parties in the market. Balance is so difficult
to achieve which calls for several specific questions:
1. How is the negotiation between advertisers, developers and
users expected to take place?
2. How should we specify different levels of privacy and relate
them with different service levels?
3. What are the incentives for advertisers, users and develop-
ers to use the negotiation model?
The solve of these questions will lead to the balance the benefits of all
three parties and achieve our primary goal of privacy-preserving.
1.3 Our Approach
To answer the first question, in this work, we propose to take advantage of
LayerCake [5]—a modified version of the Android System [6]—to clearly sep-
arate Host application and Advertisement Module permission requirements.
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By doing this the developer has no motivation to require unnecessary per-
missions from the user. The separation of the permission requirements would
provide the users with a clear and clean overview of what information is be-
ing collected and how and where is the information being used. Information
will flow to the developer and the advertiser in two individual flows.
For the second question, we introduce a new advertising model from which
each of the three parties benefits. To induce the users, we illustrate that
the advertiser get information from the user directly with out revealing any
unnecessary private information to the provider and user can choose different
privacy levels by themselves. To encourage the developers to accept the
new model we validate that when they provide more service they get more
revenue by establishing a indirect link between service and revenue. On the
advertiser side, as they get needed information directly from the user, they
could circumvent being cheated by any application developer.
In the meanwhile, with respect to the third question, we explore meth-
ods to deliver ads due to Inter-app and In-app information, which specifies
4 clear levels of privacy. Inter-app information—the list of installed appli-
cation packages, including application name, package name, version name,
version code, application icon, application installation (or modification) time,
etc—is also referred to as App Bundles in the rest parts of this thesis work.
We are also employing In-app information—demographic information and in
application behaviors collected by the host application—in our advertising
selection algorithm.
1.4 Main Contributions
Some of the major contributions of our work are listed as follows:
• Three Party Loop Module: First of all, the permissions required
by the host application and the advertising application are aimed to
be separated. Users only provide the necessary permissions to the
host app, and all the additional permissions should be independently
required by the advertisement module. Advertising app delivers the
users’ privacy information ( demographic information like age and gen-
der, in app behavior information, long term track of click through rates,
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etc) to the ad network server, then the ad server pushes selected adver-
tisement to be displayed to the users, and give corresponding revenue
to the app developers. Taking all these requirements into considera-
tion, we make modifications to the model proposed in [4]. Service from
the application provider, information flow from the user, and revenue
from the ad network, forms a three-party feedback loop. The ad net-
work is also responsible for delivering advertisements to the embedded
advertisements application.
• Exploit of App Bundles: To our knowledge, there are not many
advertising system that exploit the utilization of App Bundles. Twitter
is collecting the installed packages on Android devices [7], Facebook is
also utilizing similar information [8] but only gathered from applica-
tions that have their code baked into them. We note the importance
and significance of App Bundles, and when comparing to buying prod-
ucts from a super market, the usage of App Bundles to predict the next
possible application installed is similar to sequential pattern mining in
Data Mining field [9, 10]. We use App Bundles as the as a main factor
of selecting advertisements on the ad server side, and we use In-app
information for further filtering the ads.
• Offering four levels of privacy associated advertisement: De-
pending on the user’s preference, we provide four privacy concerned
service and advertisement related levels. With regard to privacy re-
vealing extend, the four levels include: professional functionality with
no ads, basic functionality with plain advertisements (broadcast from
the ad server without any targeting), medium functionality with Inter-
App targeted Ads by collecting App Bundles information, professional
functionality with In-App targeted Ads based on personal information
collected by the host application.
1.5 Outline
We give an outline of the following contents of this thesis.
Chapter 2 gives the thorough background information on the Android on-
line advertisement market. In particular, section 2.1 introduces the current
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design of the advertising model and argues its limitations; section 2.2 de-
scribes some known attempts of providing approaches of splitting ads from
the host apps to preserve user privacy; section 2.3 brings in the idea of App
Bundles and introduces some know attempts of utilizing App Bundles.
Chapter 3 aims to understand a modified version of Android System, Lay-
erCake, since we build our model based on this platform. Section 3.1 analyzes
the primary features of the LayerCake system, while section 3.2 introduces
how LayerCake benefits Android advertising.
Chapter 4 illustrates the concept of App Bundles and discusses why and
how could it be utilized. Sections 4.2, 4.3 respectively discuss the similar-
ity between App Bundles and Amazon Anticipatory Package Shipping and
Persistent Cookies Profiling.
Chapter 5 explains the design of our model, Four-Layer Cake. Chapter 6
gives the implementation details of our mechanism while chapter 7 offers the
evaluation demo and analysis. Last but not least, Chapter 8 concludes our
work, analyzes the limitations and proposes possible future works.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter gives background information of the current advertising model
in Android market and the existing attempts of preserving user privacy in
Android on-line advertising. In particular, section 2.1 explains the current
design of advertising model, section 2.2 describes known exploits of preserving
user privacy on Android platform, and section 2.3 gives examples of how App
Bundles information has been used.
2.1 Current Design of Advertising Model and Its
Limitations
[4] investigate the current advertising model by analyzing a popular ad-
network Admob [11]. In its generic form, this advertising model involves
three primary parties. First, the user, who receives service provided by the
mobile application developer. Second, the developer, who expects to get
compensation/revenue from the advertiser as a reward for the delivering its
service. Third, ad-network, who pays the developer when it successfully
gathers the user’s preferences and delivers targeted adverts.
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship of the three parties in the current model.
Figure 2.1: The current advertising model
6
In this model, one thing worth noting is that all the private information
of the user first flows to the developer, regardless of what does the developer
actually needs. The complete delegation of information collection means it
is possible that the user is unwilling to expose some of information to the
developer.
In Admob ad-network, the developer is paid according to an advert’s “click-
through rates”. An impression of the advert displaying in the Android ap-
plication may lead to a “click” from the user. A “click” means the user is
attracted by the ad and proceed to the download stage. The success rate
of the delivered ads means the successful operation of the advertiser, and
will significantly leads to revenue rewarded to the developer. Consequently,
Admob ad-network as well as the provider aim to generate as many “clicks”
per “impression” as possible. When the ratio of “clicks/impression” is high,
it means that the adverts are well targeted at the user. And since the ad-
vertiser need to pay the developer anyway for making the impressions to the
user, the cost of unsuccessful advertising is reduced when the ratio is high.
Demographic information (such as gender, age), location information and
social networks information are some of the kinds of information used in user
profiling algorithms for advertisement targeting.
More targeted ads means more profit and less cost, so an advertiser may
be incentivized to collect as much information as possible about the users for
accurate profiling. For the developer, it will only be rewarded when the im-
pression of an advert gets a “click”. The tight coupling of the advertisement
module and the host application shown in Figure 2.1 results in a fact that the
developer tends to support the profiling algorithm on the advertiser’s side.
This model actually could not meet the trust expectation by the user, and
lead to the consequence that the privacy requirements of the applications
rarely represents the true demand of the service provided. There should be
a pressure on the developer to constraint its request of unnecessary permis-
sions, or more effectively, a way of keep it away from touching the user’s
privacy.
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2.2 Known Attempts to Preserve Privacy on Android
Platform
There are some existing work providing some level of privacy protection to
the user, here we mainly introduce two categories:
1. Delivering mock information to the host application.
2. Splitting the advertising module from the host application.
MockDroid [1], a modified version of the Android system, is a represen-
tative of category 1. It allows a user to choose to preserve his personal
information. In MockDroid, a user could ‘mock’ the access to a resource just
like an application. After this ‘mock’ access, the resource accessed would be
marked as unavailable subsequently. Whenever an real application requests
to access the resource, it gets a report that the particular resource is empty
or unavailable. This mechanism helps the user to choose what kind of per-
sonal information that could be exposed. In the meantime, the user can be
encouraged to think about the trade-offs between the service he gets and the
disclosure of private information, as the application that request the access
to a certain resource could have provided better service if the access is au-
thorized. Though this kind of approach provides privacy preserving to some
extent, the simple forbidding of resource access would not work well the the
Android on-line advertising market, since it has not take the interest of the
advertiser into account. The ignorance of the advertiser’s profit will cause
the whole advertising market to collapse.
The balance of interest of the three parties in the advertising model is
fundamental. To this end, we look at the second category: attempts of
splitting advertisement module from the host application. The deployment
of methods in this category still ensures that the advertiser gets profit.
[4] proposes a framework which includes a market mechanism and estab-
lishes a three-party virtuous feedback loop. This feedback loop works well
to balance between the privacy information collected from the user and the
service provided to the user. In a word, the user exchanges more privacy
information for more services. For the provider, the more service it provides
it gets more rewards. For the advertiser, the more profiling information col-
lected, the more accurate the advertisement targeting would be. None of the
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three parties can abuse its ability of controlling the resource that it owns. In
this model, the private information needed by the advertiser directly flows
to the ad-network, instead of being collected by the developers first. The ad-
network therefore gives the corresponding revenue to the developer according
to the click through rates of the advert. The developer provides different lev-
els of services due to the resulting revenue. A redesigned application market
is also playing a important role. The new market will ask the users to rate
applications, those applications who ask for unreasonable permissions will
get low scores, and the most unwanted permissions will be listed as most
conspicuous. With the help of peer-pressure from a redesigned market, the
developers can be incentivized to not collect unnecessary privacy information
from the users. The proposed framework is implemented as a separate adver-
tisement service which allows other applications to subscribe to. A real time
monitor is responsible for monitoring the data flows between the three par-
ties, recording the overall clicks and controlling revenue. There are, though,
limitations of this mechanism. This design does not allow the user to choose
what kind of information can be exposed. The upgrade of service level and
the privacy exposure level may not be out of the user’s willingness.
Adsplit [12] proposes an approach to automatically separate an application
and its advertisement module, thus allows them to run in different and inde-
pendent processes under different user-ids. In this way, permissions required
by advertisements can be separated from those required by host applica-
tions, giving the user a clear prospect on how their privacy information is
used. This function of AdSplit is achieved by providing AdWebview, a built-
in advertisement application in Android core distribution. AdWebView could
load HTML and Javascript from advertising libraries, fetch advertisements
accordingly, and display the advertisements on a WebView component in
separated process and activity. It supports three categories of permissions:
the permission to load a url, the permission to call to HTML5 geo-location
API and the permission to maintain long-term tracking cookies. However, the
process of granting permission is non-negotiable. Users would either grant all
the permissions required by an advertiser or have all the permissions denied.
Also, it is unclear how host applications could respond when advertisement
permissions are denied. Adsplit successfully prevents programmatic click-
fraud attacks using Quire [13], by authenticating user input.
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LayerCake [5] explores the requirements to support secure embedded user
interfaces of a system. The researchers analyze existing systems such as
browsers and smart phones systematically, with regard to whether they pro-
vide security properties and how do they provide these properties if any. They
make a modification to Android system (Android 4.2 JELLY BEAN MR1)
and end up with being capable of supporting secure interface embedding.
They implement their design and evaluate the implementation using case
studies which are based on embedded interfaces. Advertisement libraries
and Facebook social plugins, which are typical types of embedded widgets,
are evaluated. The LayerCake system has been deployed in some of the re-
cent works of the research group from University of Washington, showing in
[14] and [15].
2.3 Known Uses of App Bundles
The news of Twitter [7] starting to track user’s installed packages for advertis-
ing targeting purposes quickly exploded on November 26th, 2014 [16, 17, 18].
The app tracking mentioned in the above news, means that Twitter appli-
cation on Android, is tracking lists of applications installed and the in-app
basic metadata to use for advertising. As is mentioned in 1.2, the list of
applications installed, we will use App Bundles to refer to it in the rest of
this work.
The fact that the related API [19] is built in the Android Operating System
makes it extremely easy to get the App Bundles. What’s more, the calling of
this API does not even require any special permissions. A simple call of get-
PackageManager().getInstalledPackages() returns the developer with all the
information about installed packages on a device, including application name,
package name, version name, version code, application icon, application in-
stallation time, etc. There are even more ways provided by the Android API
to refine the results, for example, a call to getPackagesHoldingPermissions()
returns a list of all installed packages that are currently holding any of the
given permissions on the device. Package manager can also pull information
about a particular individual application once it is determined this appli-
cation has already been installed. Twitter claims that they have only been
10
collecting and updating data of applications that the users have installed,
but not using any in-app information [7]. In our work we propose to use
in-app information from our host application to further tailor the result set
of advertisements.
To our knowledge Twitter is a pioneer of social networks who collects such
information on users devices, but maybe not the only one. Facebook has been
reported to being collecting similar data [8], but only from applications that
have their code baked into them. This is referred to as “software development
kit” [20].
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CHAPTER 3
ANDROID LAYERCAKE AS A PLATFORM
Smart phone applications nowadays commonly embed third-party user in-
terfaces such as advertisements, Facebook social plugins, and access con-
trol gadgets[5]. The capability of embedding third party user interfaces
comes with security issues, and Android does not yet support secure cross-
application interface embedding. The LayerCake [5] group proposes to mod-
ify the Android operating system to provide support for secure embedded
user interfaces from scratch. Our work, Four-layer Cake, uses LayerCake
as a platform to build our models on, so this chapter gives an introduction
of what main features does LayerCake provide and how does it work when
embedding advertisement module.
3.1 LayerCake Features
LayerCake, a modified version of the Android system, supports secure cross-
application embedding via making changes to the ActivityManager class, the
WindowManager class, and input dispatching. Some features of LayerCake
that are fundamental to Android on-line advertising will be listed as follows:
• Allow more than one application to be visible to the user at the same
time.
• Allow one application to embed one or multiple instances of other Ac-
tivities which does not interfere with each other.
• Provide clickjacking prevention and ancestor redirection prevention.
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3.1.1 Visualization of More Than One Application
Android UI provides the user with a particular view for an application. An
application may consist multiple Activities, each of them defines built in
View elements. The original Android operating system’s ActivityManager
could only keep one Activity in the foreground. An application is not capa-
ble of embedding an Activity from a different application. Though Android
ActivityGroups provide UI code reuse within the same application, it does
not support true cross-application embedding. LayerCake explores to al-
low one application to embed Activities from a different and independent
application. The embedded Activities run in a separate process. Android’s
WindowsManager isolates the window of each application, i.e., an application
cannot access the window from another application, nor could it dispatch the
user input for the other application. The isolation properties are relied on by
the LayerCake design. In LayerCake, multiple applications may have visible
windows, though only one application could be in the foreground, and their
interaction with the user are clearly isolated.
This allows the advertisement module in Four-Layer Cake to share the
view with the host application, in a secure cross-application embedding way.
3.1.2 One Host Embedding Multiple Applications
A new View called EmbeddedActivityView is introduced into Android’s
UI toolkit. This View allows the embedding of another application’s Activity
to a host application. Specifying the package and class names of the embed-
ded Activity in the parameters of the EmbeddedActivityView ensures the
success of embedding in the host application’s interface.
Android’s ActivityManager is extended to support embedded Activities.
These embedded Activities are launched when the corresponding instances of
EmbeddedActivityView is created and displayed. One thing is that the em-
bedded Activities are not under the control of ActivityManager, they follow
the life cycle of the embedding Activity.
Multiple Activities may be embedded in the same host application. The
embedded Activities themselves may also embed one or more Activities.
What’s more, multiple instances of the same Activity may be sharing the
same host. An application may also be embedded by multiple host appli-
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cations, thus allowing the leverage of information collected inside different
hosts.
The fact multiple embedded activities are supported makes it possible for
an Android application to embed advertising module for different advertise-
ment networks.
3.1.3 Clickjacking Prevention
A clickjacking attack [21] happens when a malicious application tricks or
compels a user into interacting with an interface. For example, a malicious
application may make an interactive UI element as transparent, thus the user
has the chance of passing through inputs into it with out knowing anything.
LayerCake is able to prevent clickjacking by checking the following:
1. Whether the Activity is covered by another window (obscured).
2. Whether the minimum requested size is not met.
3. Whether the Activity is not fully visible due to window placement (a
View could be cropped due to scrolling).
If any of the answers to the above question is “YES”, LayerCake would
just discard the embedded Activity’s user input.
These rules help prevent the application providers from cheating users for
more clicks.
3.2 LayerCake Performance when Embedding
Advertising
In the current Android design, stock Android applications embeds third-party
advertisements and provides an AdView element to show the adverts, and
ad library module is running in the same process as the host applications.
In LayerCake, modifications have been made to separate the AdView out
into an individual process. In the evaluation demo, a wrapper application for
AdMob [11], a primary advertisement library, is created as an embeddable
application. All of the APIs of the ad library is exposed across the process
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boundary, making it possible for the host application to pass on parameters
to it.
LayerCake is successful in moving ads into an individual process and ad-
dresses a number of concerns. First and most importantly, permissions
needed by the advertisement library would no longer be requested by the
parent application. Second, an ad library could also no longer abuse a host
application’s permissions [22]. Thirdlym the fact that all ads from the same
ad library—even if the Admob application is embedded in different host
applications—run in the same process allows the Admob wrapper applica-
tion to leverage input from different host application sources. Last but not
least, the host application can no longer be capable of mounting program-
matic click fraud attacks.
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CHAPTER 4
IDEAS RELATED TO APP BUNDLES
Twitter is most likely to be the pioneer of exploiting the usage of App Bun-
dles. There are, though, a small number of know attempts of using this
information.
App brain[23] is an online Android Market which allows users to upload
lists of installed applications to it for management. App Usage Tracker [24],
an application available in the Google Play Store [25], tracks how all the
installed apps are getting used on the device, and depicts the usage informa-
tion in a graphical format. We can come to the conclusion that the usage of
App Bundle information in Android on-line Advertising is still in its early
stage, and we need to further explore the features of it.
Though the usage of App Bundles still needs exploration, there are exam-
ples in other areas that provides similar attempts of using known information
to make predictions.
Three concrete examples are given as follows: section 4.1 introduces that
the idea of sequential pattern mining has been used for prediction in the
medicine field, section 4.2 illustrates how does Amazon anticipatory package
shipping work, section 4.3 finds the similarity between App Bundles and
persistent cookies.
4.1 Sequential Pattern Mining for Prediction in
Medicine Field
Sequential pattern mining [9] is a data mining technique which can be used to
identify patterns of sequenced events within a database. The original appli-
cation of sequential pattern mining is in the retail industry: after purchasing
a particular book, a customer is predicted to buy its sequel within a certain
time period.
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Applications in medicine field were proposed in [26], and have received
great success in disease susceptibility prediction [27]. [28] uses sequential
pattern mining to establish temporary links between medications automat-
ically. The links are visualized and used for generating rules to predict the
next possible medicine prescribed to the patient. [28] does evaluations re-
spectively at drug level and drug class level, and come to a conclusion that
frequent pattern mining is effective in identifying the temporary links be-
tween medicines and predicting the next prescribed medicine.
As is mentioned in Section 1.2, App Bundles information includes appli-
cation name and application installation (or modification) time, in our work
we also classify applications into different types. When being compared to
the prediction in medication prescription, an application is a “medicine”, its
installation time is the “prescribed time”, and its type information is the
“drug class” in medication.
4.2 Amazon Anticipatory Package Shipping
A news titled Amazon knows what you want before you buy it [29] claims
that Amazon could conceivably use a patent for the algorithm-based system
to ship products even before the customer place an order.
Officially known as “method and system for anticipatory package ship-
ping” [30], the benefits of the system are obvious: the accurate predicting
of customers orders helps increase sales. Further more, the potential money
and time cost of shipping could be largely reduced.
Figure 4.1 shows how the Amazon anticipatory package shipping work.
According to the patent, the prediction model is using data from a user’s
previous Amazon behaviors, including but not only, time on-line, links clicked
in site, duration of views, wishing list, shopping history and shopping cart
status. The algorithm also takes real-world customer personal information
into account. These information can be collected from customer telephone
inquiries, responses to advertising materials, and so on.
App Bundles could be made analogy to Amazon’s anticipatory package
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Figure 4.1: How does Amazon Anticipatory Package Shipping Work
shipping patent to some extent. In our case, an application not yet installed
is our “commodity” for sale, the App Bundle information is like the shopping
history of Amazon. Amazon make predictions, or anticipatory package ship-
ping officially, (partially) due to the shopping cart activities and we make our
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recommendations due to the “bought” applications. To this end, we could
also take an insight into Amazon’s efforts and employ their algorithms in our
future work, even though in chapter 6 we are employing a straight forward
algorithm for demo the advertising procedure: select advertisements based
on the installed packages and recommend similar applications.
4.3 Persistent Cookies Profiling
Cookies has been working as a tagging mechanism of identifying a user out of
millions. Cookie profiling uses persistent cookies to track the overall activities
of a user online.
Cookies tracking is occurring whenever you are browsing [31] web pages.
Marketers/advertisers are most likely to do cookies profiling. They collect
and collate information about a certain user from cookies and create the “pro-
file” for him. The behaviour of a user when browsing the Internet becomes
the reason why he has been targeted by a particular collection of adverts
[32].
Cookie profiling is the only way for marketers/advertisers to target po-
tential customers and obtain a possible product purchase from them. By
knowing a users browsing habits, including sites visited, age, gender, marital
status, political preferences and religious affiliations, they can show him or
her advertisements that are appealing, advertisements that he or she will care
to patronize. This is a way for marketers/advertisers to increase their profit
and cut down on the cost of unsuccessful delivery of adverts by accurately
targeting their customer.
The advantage of using cookies to do the on-line profiling is that it is
permitted by users to some extent, since the profiling using cookies is less
alarming and less offensive than, for example, buying data from social net-
works.
There could also be a line drawing from Four-Layer Cake App Bundles
usage to Cookies profiling as analogies. Both of them are used for on-line
advertising purposes, though one in web browsers and the other in Android
applications. App Bundles is just like the persistent cookies, which stores
the past “behavior” of the user, and with a careful designing of algorithm,
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can make accurate predictions about a user. The App Bundles is also a
long term information as an Android device is always having some installed
applications. In our approach we are also using in-app information gathered
by host application to make more targeted ads. An obvious thing is that,
the more in-app information we get, the more accurate the adverting would
be. This is actually similar as the multi-source cookies used for profiling in
the web browser advertising.
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CHAPTER 5
FOUR-LAYER CAKE DESIGN
Our work mainly includes two core parts: the three parties feedback loop
and the four levels of privacy. Section 5.1 illustrates the related work for
our design, section 5.2 introduces the idea of a modified three party feedback
loop, section 5.3 gives the idea of four privacy levels with regard to user
preferences.
5.1 Related Work
As is mentioned by figure 2.1 in section 2.1, in a typical in-application ad-
vertisement under the current advertisement model, the collecting of user
demographic information is delegated to the host application.
Figure 5.1: Three-Party Feedback Loop Model for Android Advertising
The tight coupling of the ad-network module with the host application
brings the result that the permissions required for advertisement targeting
are publicized as part of the host application’s permission requirements. The
21
obscuring of who might access the users’ personal information and how these
information would be used causes privacy concerns.
To resolve this problem, [4] proposes a decoupled three-party feedback loop
model, shown in Figure 5.1. In this new model, decoupling privacy control
between the advertisement component and the host application is achieved.
There are two independent information flows flowing respectively towards the
ad-network and the host-application. This separation allows users to have
different sharing agreements with the other two parties, and makes it easier
for users to be aware of how is their information used.
[4] achieves the decoupling of application and advertising permissions by
separating the two functions into distinct binaries. A generic advertising
service which requests its own set of permissions is implemented. This service
exports a new Intent for other applications to subscribe to.
Our work keeps the idea of three party feedback loop but does some modifi-
cations to employ LayerCake [5] to do the permission separation. LayerCake
modified the Android system source code to support secure cross-application
embedding, more details have been illustrated in chapter 3.
5.2 Modified Three Parties Feedback Loop
To balance user privacy and still protect the benifits of developers to ensure
that they get deserved rewards for delivering the service, we establish a clear
three-party model and form a feedback loop between each pair of parties.
Our idea can be illustrated by Figure 5.2.
First of all, the permissions required by the host app and the advertisement
app, which is used to display the advertisements, are separated. Users only
provide the necessary permissions to the host app, and all the additional
permissions should be independently required by the advertisement appli-
cation, which is running in a separate process. Advertisement application
gets the users’ privacy information and delivers selected advertisement to be
displayed in the host application’s EmbededView as a Banner Ad, and gives
corresponding revenue to the host app developer. We adopt LayerCake to
support secure embedded interfaces such that the host application and the
ad application can be developed in two completely independent process.
We then propose to form a three-party feedback Loop to balance privacy
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Figure 5.2: Modified Three-Party Advertisement Model for Android
and service (from the user’s point of view). After the separating of per-
missions for the host application and the advertisements, we re-develop the
applications and utilize LayerCake’s feature to embed the ad application into
the host. The information flows, service and revenue form a feed back loop
between the user, the ad network and the developer (the loop is marked as
red in Figure 5.2). The user can “pay” with privacy information in exchange
for services, and the developer gets paid by encouraging the user to give
more accurate privacy information. The advertisement application reports
individual clicks to the ad network to calculate revenue to the developer. In
this feedback loop, the advertisement application starts with plain ads, and
may require more information from the user if the user requires more service
(without paying off to the developer directly).
5.3 Four Layers of Privacy
We propose to provide users with four levels of ads to choose.
• Highest Privacy Level (Level 3): No Ads, when the user chooses to make
a payment directly to the provider to get rid of the advertisements.
• Fundamental Privacy Level (Level 2): Plain Ads, which means the
advertiser broadcasts ads without targeting.
• Pragmatism Privacy Level (Level 1): Inter-app Ads, which means App
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Bundles information is used to select advertisements.
• Unconcerned Privacy Level (Level 0): In-app Ads, which means user
information in the host app is gathered to refine ads to be more tar-
geted.
Figure 5.3 shows the details of the four layers.
Figure 5.3: Four-Layer Cake Privacy Model for Android
The feedback loop mentioned in section 5.2 starts with Fundamental Pri-
vacy Level (Level 2). No special information about the user or his device
is provided to the developer or the advertiser, only plain ads are broadcast
from the advertisement library server to each of the advertisement client con-
nected to this server. If a user allows the usage of inter-app information for
advertising purposes, the advertisement application will run for some time
and collect all the App Bundles information which will then be reported to
the server, and the user will be at Pragmatism Privacy Level (Level 1). Then
if the user prefers to upgrade his service, he has two choices. To get rid of
the advertisement and reach Highest Privacy Level (Level 3), he could make
a direct payment to the service’s provider; or, he can also choose to move to
Unconcerned Privacy Level (Level 0) to get more service [33, 34] and more
targeted ads. More details are demonstrated in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPLEMENTATION
After understanding the mechanism and algorithms of our approach, this
chapter gives implementation details of the Four-Layer Cake model. While
the above model intuitively appears to be reasonable, it is not guaranteed
that it provides satisfiable performance in practice. We explore what it takes
in practice by demonstrating our model in chapter 7.
To provide a direct overview of the model introduced in this work, an
advertisement library server and an application client on Android mobile
phone are needed. We are not using any existing ad library, but building our
own advertisement library server, to maintain more flexible query interfaces
and provide modifiable advertisement recommendation strategy. Up to 5
threads are supported in our server.
On the Android client side, we are using LG NEXUS as a testing environ-
ment device. Android Layercake System is flashed into this device to support
interactions and permissions separation between host application and its em-
bedded activity.
Communications between the advertisement server and the android appli-
cation are established via Socket. In section 6.1 we describe the Multi-thread
advertisement library server implementation while section 6.2 describes the
techniques we used on the Android Client side. Section 6.3 illustrates how
the states of the advertising process change by presenting our socket commu-
nication finite state automaton. Since in our Four-Layer Cake model, both
the Plain Ads Level and the Inter-app Ads Level require no additional per-
missions, for simplification, with regard to privacy Level, we just start from
the No Ads (no privacy information provided to Advertiser), then Inter-App
Ads (only use App Bundles information and requires no additional permis-
sions), and then In-app Ads (requires personalized meta data collected by
the host application).
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6.1 Advertisement Library Server Implementation
Four-Layer Cake Model requires the support from a manageable advertise-
ment library server. In our implementation, we used Java SE 1.6 development
environment.
Figure 6.1: Advertisement Library Server
The server is expected to provide mainly four functionalities:
• Sending and accepting data flows to and from the client side.
• Interpreting data from bytes into strings or from strings to bytes.
• Maintaining database for advertisements information querying and re-
trieval.
• Storing advertisement files.
The coordination of the four modules are shown in figure 6.1.
First of all, the Communication Module. All of our commands and data are
transmitted using Java Socket. In our code, the package /Server/src/socket
includes SocketServer.java and SocketThread.java. SocketServer class helps
maintain a thread pool of size 5, which allows up to 5 clients to connect
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to the advertisement library server. SocketServer is also responsible for ac-
cepting in-coming connections from clients and starting a new instance of
SocketThread for each new client. SocketThread class provides individual
and non-interfering threads for each client. It first waits until getting a con-
nection request from a client, then it creates a new connection to the local
database for afterwards queries. When it gets a command, since Socket com-
munication transmits bytes, we need to interpret the command into string,
using the embedded Command/Data Interpreting module. The advertise-
ment results are also interpreted back into bytes and then sent to the client.
The Server and the Client need to strictly follow the loop of sequences of
Command number–Data length–Data–Command number–... when communi-
cating, since Socket accepts all the data bytes as a stream, it cannot recognize
individual commands or messages by itself.
Another package in our source code, /Server/src/operation contains DB-
Operation.java which provides interfaces of querying the database and re-
turning result sets. The table Ad has the following keys: id, AppName,
AppAdLocation, AppDownloadURL, AppType, UserAgeRange.
As Socket only transmits bytes, /Server/src/operation/Transfer.java pro-
vides the functionality of translating between strings and bytes. We are using
ISO-8859-1 as the encoding standard.
The ads are stored in the server’s local storage. The stored location of
the ads in the result set of the database query is used to get ads from the
local disk. The ads are returned to the interpreting module as picture file
instances, and will then be interpreted into bytes and transmitted to the
client via the communication module.
6.2 Android App Client Implementation
The Android application client implementation is based on the LayerCake
System [5]. As mentioned before, LayerCake is a modified version of Android
operating system which allows the using of secure embedded user interfaces
and supports the host application to embed another activity that runs in a
individual process.
The Android client includes two core parts. The host application provides
functionality while the embedded ad application is responsible for displaying
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the ads and communicating with the ad library server. The information flows
collected by the two applications are exactly separated since they are running
in two independent processes. The relationship of the two parts are shown
in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Android Application Client
The Host Application, in our test, is a health coach master which allows the
user to keep track of the calories that he takes from meals, and the calories
that he consumes when he works out. It only asks for necessary permissions
upon installation and does not require additional permissions for the ad-
vertising module. The advertisement application is installed independently.
When the user gets the basic version of the application, he is only offered
an overview of his calories information and the UI to record his meals. Only
after unlocking the exercise functionality could the user access the third tab
to record how many calories he consumes via working out. There are two
buttons in the Host Application provided to the user to have the third tab
unlocked: making a payment (and also the user gets rid of the ads, so that
the provider’s revenue comes directly from the user’s payment), or provid-
ing in-app personal meta data (and also get more targeted advertisements).
The Host Application provides an EmbeddedView for the banner advertise-
ment (which is enabled by the modified Android System LayerCake) to be
displayed.
The ad application has a transparent UI of itself and is only visible to the
user when showing in the host application. When it is embedded in the host
application, the ad picture is retrieved from the ad library server and then
displayed as a banner. When the banner is clicked on, a message prompts
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Figure 6.3: Communication between Host App and Ad App process
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and asks the user’s permission for the advert to be fully displayed. Once the
user agrees to view the whole advertisement, the ad application starts an
new Intent to call the system browser. The browser brings out the complete
information about the application in the displayed advertisement by loading
contents using the ad’s corresponding url. On the page loaded, the user can
choose to read the full description of the application and download it.
The inter-process communication is accomplished using Android interface
definition language. In a word, both the host application and the ad appli-
cation define interfaces and claim methods and variables which are available
for the other one to use. The AIDL compiler outputs an interface translated
as the Java programming language from the interface defined in the .aidl
file. Then both application implement their own interface methods which
are necessary for IPC calls. An inner abstract class named Stub that inherits
the interface is implemented in both the host and the ad applications.
Figure 6.3 shows the procedure of how the embedded ads are shown and
updated. The host application implements IEmbeddedContainer while the
ad application implements IRemoteEmbeddedAd. When the host application
is first created and opened, the onCreate method is called and everything
is initialized. Then the host application shares an instance of the IEmbed-
dedContainer to the child process (here the ad application) and refers it
as parentBinder. The ad application creates an instance ownInterface of the
IRemoteEmbeddedAd and in the meantime gets the reference to parentBinder.
The child process then passes its ownInterface as an argument to the main
process via containerInterface.registerChildInterface(ownInterface), which is
implemented in the Stub class in the host application. The host application
starts a new thread to monitor user preference. When the user allows the
collection of his demographic information, the host application sends the in-
formation to ad application, which then communicates with the ad library
server. The user gets more targeted ads after the upload of demographic
information, and also unlocks the professional functionality. On the other
hand, when the user chooses to make a payment to the provider directly, the
third functionality could also be unlocked and the user gets rid of all the
advertisements.
The communication actions with the ad library server are all implemented
in the ad application using Socket. For consistency the ad application is
using the same Transfer class as is used on the server side. When it starts to
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send a command, it first uses Transfer.FromStringToBytes() to interpret the
command into bytes before communicating with the server. As is mentioned
in section 6.1, the data sent from this Client side also strictly follows the loop
of sequences of Command number–Data length–Data–Command number–....
6.3 Advertising Procedure
After the illustration of the details on the ad library server side and the
application client side, we now come to an overview of the complete procedure
of our advertising, which is shown in Figure 6.4.
We set up our multi-thread server to wait for the connection request from
the Android client. The client sends command ID 1 using socket.write() to
request a connection. After a connection is successfully established, the client
then starts to send App Bundles information to the server using command
ID 2, followed by the App Bundles list size, and then, length of each package
name, and finally the packagename. All the strings are translated into bytes
before goes to Socket.
After finishing receiving all the data after command 2, the server first
translates the bytes into strings and selects appropriate ads due to the app
types from the database. A collection C of three lists which all follow the
same index order—AdPicLocation list, AdDownloadURL list, UserAgeRange
list—is then created due to the result set of querying the database. When
user’s age information has not been updated from the client, the server sends
periodically (refreshing every 10 seconds in our Demo) both the advertise-
ment and the corresponding downloading url of every application in C to the
client side.
Similar to command ID 2, here the server sends command ID 3 to the
client to indicate the start of actual advertising. For each advertisement
in the list, the server sends the length of the ad picture file, then the file
itself, followed by the length of the download url, and finally the download
url. Once the user selects to exchange his demographic information for more
functionality, the server further filters the ads (stop sending those Ads that
the age range does not match with the user of the current host application)
and keeps refreshing. The user can also choose to get more functionality by
making a payment directly to the application provider and stop receiving ads
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Figure 6.4: Communication process between Ad Library Server and
Android Client
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Figure 6.5: Advertising Process and State Transition Finite State
Automaton
from the advertiser.
Algorithm 1 Advertisement Selection and Filtering Algorithm
1: procedure Advertising
2: Client gets user age a from host app and sends to server
3: for each app name n ∈ App Bundle L do
4: Client sends n message to Server
5: Server queries database Ad table using n and get the app type t
6: Server queries database Ad table using t and get result set S
7: for each result s ∈ result set S do
8: add ad location to list L
9: add ad url to list U
10: add app user age range to list R
11: end for
12: for each age range ar ∈ R do
13: if a matches ar then
14: get ad from ad location and send to Client
15: get ad url and send to Client
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: end procedure
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One thing worth noting here is that, once the actual advertising has
started, the server is only sending ads and the client is only receiving ads.
Socket supports full-duplex communication so the input stream of the server
side and the output stream of the client side can still be utilized. In our
implementation, the server has a child thread which monitors the reporting
of user age from the client, while on the client side, the ad application has
a child thread that listens to the host application, once the user allows the
sharing of age information in the host application, this child thread reports
it to the server.
Figure 6.5 uses a finite state automaton to describe the state transitions
of the above procedure. State 0 indicates the initialization of the system,
state 1 shows the connection of the server and the client, when in state 2, the
user keeps receiving Inter-App Ads until he chooses any of the two options
to upgrade his Health Coach Master to get more functionality, while sharing
in-app information (user’s age in our case) leads to state 3, and payment
leads to state 4. A user cannot transit from state 3 to state 4 or in the
opposite direction.
Algorithm 1 introduces how the advertisement library server selects and
filters ads with regard to a particular client. Before the user choose to share
the age information with the server, the server simply collects and collates
all the possible advertisements matching the type of every application from
App Bundles information. After age information is uploaded, it is used as
a filter to get rid of any application that does not match the reported age
range.
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CHAPTER 7
DEMO AND EVALUATION
After the implementation of our model, we do a demo using the ad library
server and the Android application client. Section 7.1 shows the procedure of
how the implemented demo works. Section 7.2 demonstrates the advantages
of our work and provides analysis of limitations of this work.
7.1 Demo
We use 8 sample applications in our demo. Table 7.1 shows the information
of the related applications:
Table 7.1: Advertisements Used in the Demo
ID AppName AdPicLoc AppUrl AppType UserAgeRange
0 30DAY S ... ... 0 2X
1 EATFIT ... ... 0 3X
2 FITBODY ... ... 0 4X
3 LAY AMUSIC ... ... 1 2X
4 MUSICPLAY ER ... ... 1 3X
5 BEATSMUSIC ... ... 1 4X
6 HealthCoachManager ... ... 0 2X
7 Music ... ... 1 3X
First we will explain what does each of the keys in Table 7.1 mean.
• ID is the unique primary key of each application in the database, it
starts from 0 and it is auto-increment.
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Figure 7.1: Ads Loop 1 : Health-related (AppType 0) Ads
Figure 7.2: Ads Loop 2 : Music-related (AppType 1) Ads
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• AppName shows the packagename the same as what could be got using
getInstalledPackage() by our Android application client.
• AdPicLoc is the locations of the advertisement picture stored in the
Server’s local disk.
• AppUrl is the url in Google Play Store which leads to the downloading
page of the advertised application.
• AppType shows which AppType does a application belong to. In our
demo we’re using 2 AppTypes of applications. When the value of App-
Type is 0, it means the application is health-related, while AppType 1
means it is a music-related application.
• One application is always most prevalent among a particular user group
in a certain age range, revealed by UserAgeRange in the above Table.
The 8 sample ads include 4 apps in AppType 0 and 4 apps in AppType
1, 3 apps most popular in the user group of ages 20s, 3 most prevalent with
users in their 30s and 2 for those in their 40s.
Our demo host application Health Coach Manager is a health-related appli-
cation, its AppType is recorded as 0 in Table 7.1. Other installed applications
in our test device include Music, Bluetooth, Email, Browser, etc.
The procedure of advertising is as follows.
When the Health Coach Master application is first opened, it is initialized
and an EmbeddedView instance is created. Now the user is at Inter-App Ads
Level and get basic functionality of the application: the overall information
and the UI of recording his calories taking from meals. The embedded ad
application sends App Bundles information to the ad library server. The list
of package names in our App Bundles information includes Music, Bluetooth,
Email, Browser, Health Coach Manager, etc. Only 2 of them are in our test
data set, Music and Health Coach Manager, of AppType 1 and 0 respec-
tively. The querying of AppType = 0 returns a set of applications: 30DAYS,
EATFIT and FITBODY. Similarly, The querying of AppType = 1 returns
LAYAMUSIC, MUSICPLAYER and BEATSMUSIC. The server then is pre-
pared with a list of applications: 30DAYS, EATFIT and FITBODY, LAYA-
MUSIC, MUSICPLAYER and BEATSMUSIC. The server then sends ads to
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the client, one at a time, and refreshes every 10 seconds. The refreshments
of advertisements are shown in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2.
Clicking on any of these ads prompts a dialogue asking the user’s permis-
sion to display the complete ad in a browser, shown in Figure 7.3. Once the
user chooses “OK” the application starts a new intent to call the browser, in
which the application is completely shown in Google Play Store, where the
user can view the full information of the app and install it.
Figure 7.3: Click on Ads to Show Application in Google Play Store
The two buttons on the bottom of the host application, PAY and INFO,
which can also be seen in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 provide the user oppor-
tunities of upgrading his service.
When the Pay button is clicked the user pays service fees directly to the
application developer to unlock the third functionality: keep track of calories
consumed via exercises, and also gets rids of all the advertisements. The
result of the payment activity is shown in Figure 7.4.
The other button Info, when clicked, it means the user agrees to share his
demographic information with the advertiser to unlock the Exercise function-
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Figure 7.4: Unlock Professional Functionality via Payment
Figure 7.5: Unlock Professional Functionality via Payment
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ality and gets more targeted ads. In our demo, our host application collects
the user’s age information, 20, and updates it to the server. The server,
which has been monitoring the receiving of the user’s demographic informa-
tion, starts to use UserAge as a filter to stop sending less matching ads. In
Table 7.1, only 30DAYS and LAYAMUSIC are recorded as most prevanlent
among the users in their 20s, so the resulting advertisements are shown in
Figure 7.5, only the two ads for 30DAYS and LAYAMUSIC are periodically
delivered to the client.
7.2 Evaluation and Analysis
From our demo we demonstrate that our model effectively provides permis-
sion separating for the advertisement module and the host application. The
design of privacy levels for the users to choose considers the preferences of
different users and balances between service and privacy.
The advantage of our approach is obvious: first of all, our model solves the
problem of privacy offense with regard to the user; on the other hand, the
benefits of the advertiser is also protected by preventing click fraud cheating
from the provider; last but not least, for the provider, the ad library is no
longer able to abuse the permissions it gets from the host application. In a
word, the three party feedback loop balances the benefits of each entity in
the advertisement model. There are actually some applications on the iOS
platform that provides in-app purchases [35] to get rid of the ads. This is a
“two-layer” advertisement model to some extent, providing a No Ads level
and a Having Ads Level. Our work, designed with four layers, considers more
about the variances and changes of users’ preferences by offering the users
with more levels to choose.
There are, however, limitations of our work. Most significantly, the de-
ployment of LayerCake system as a platform means that our model does not
work in any original Android system. It is difficult for Google to incorporate
the new model into their design since the current model is still prevalent
and has not caused too many complaints from the users. What’s more, our
model proposes that all the permissions required by different applications
being clearly stated to the user, which might be good to some users who
have good security and privacy background knowledge, but might also cause
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panic among those who have not been caring too much about their privacy
previously. This means our model could also be hard for the users to accept.
Also, our work uses a simple and naive recommendation algorithm: find ap-
plications which are similar to what have been installed, which means our
prediction may not be accurate enough.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this master thesis work, we study the privacy problems in the current
Android on-line advertising model. With the explore of the background
knowledge, we discover that many Android applications rely on the revenue
from the advertiser. The current advertising model brings about privacy
offense problems with regard to the user. After doing the analysis of know
attempts of preserving user privacy, we address two approaches in our work.
Our first approach separates ad library permission requirements from the
host application and forms a clear three party feedback loop, and the second
approach provides the user with a four-level privacy concerned advertisement
mechanism.
Our model call into further attention to alternate the design of current
Android on-line advertising model. However, our design still has some lim-
itations. First, our implementation uses LayerCake System as a platform,
which requires the modification of the Android system source code. This lead
to the difficulty for Google to incorporate the new model into their design
in recent years. Second, our new model proposes to use App Bundles infor-
mation and presents the user with clear described permission requirements.
This could be good news to some users who have background knowledge
about privacy but could also cause panic among the other users who have
not been caring anything about their personal information previously. In the
latter case, the new model would actually be even harder to be accepted,
before the users understand why and how their privacy should be protected.
Third, our advertising procedure adopts a naive recommendation and pre-
diction algorithm, and has been doing the test using a relatively small data
set.
There is still a long way to go before this work can be applied in real life.
There are some future works that could be done. First, we can design and
adopt more reasonable and accurate prediction algorithms for the advertise-
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ment selection. Second, we are using static App Bundle information in our
current implementation, however, we could always modify our code to sup-
port App Bundles information updating, which means, whenever after the
user installs a new application, the ads targeted at him may be different.
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